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COMMENTS

LIABILITY OF FRANCHISORS FOR THE TORTS
OF THEIR MONTANA FRANCHISEES
E. Wayne Phillips
I.

INTRODUCTION

Courts have described franchising as a system for distributing
goods or services under a brand name through outlets owned by
independent businesses called franchises.1 The franchise relationship is governed by an elaborate contract under which the franchisee conducts a business or sells a product or services in accordance with prescribed methods and procedures.2 The franchise
relationship provides the franchisee with advertising, promotion,
training, financing, and other specialized management resources.'
The franchisor, on the other hand, obtains from the relationship a
standardized, broad distribution of its goods or services, thereby
increasing the franchisor's return while reducing its risks.
The system of sales under a franchising agreement became a
distinct part of American business with the franchising of auto and
soft drink sales in the 1890s.' The development of franchise operations such as McDonalds, Kentucky Fried Chicken, Howard Johnson Motels, and others created a franchising boom in the 1950s.1
The phenomenal growth and success of franchises in that period
resulted from several economic and social factors. The
suburbanization of American cities created an opportunity for entrepreneurs to meet demands of individuals for goods and services
located far from traditional business districts. Franchising provided the enterprising individual with a business structure for capitalizing on that opportunity. The joblessness created by major ec1. Murphy v. Holiday Inns, Inc., 216 Va. 490, 494, 219 S.E.2d 874, 877 (1975) (quoting
R. Rosenberg, PROFITS FROM FRANCHISING 41 (1969)).
2. In its modern form, franchising probably originated when the Singer Sewing Machine Company established its elaborate sales system after the Civil War. C. VAUGHN,
FRANCHISING 11 (1974).
3. H & R Block, Inc. v. Lovelace, 208 Kan. 538, 545, 493 P.2d 205, 211 (1972).
4. C. VAUGHN, supra note 2, at 25.
5. Id. at 15-17.
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onomic upheavals, such as the end of the Korean War and the
switch from an industrial to a service economy, spawned a pool of
talented people who responded to the attractive aspects of independent ownership and minimum capital requirements of
franchises. Finally, public figures began associating their names
with franchise advertising, leading to greatly increased acceptance
of franchise products and services by the public.'
This initial wave of the franchise boom peaked in 1968. 7 However, in recent years, a new and significant upsurge in franchising
has developed.! Modern entrepreneurs have created franchise options such as freeze drying of pets, aptly named Preserve-A-Pet,9
and radon testing of homes, to mention just a few of the approximately five hundred or so new franchises created in the United
States each year. 10
The unique registration process for new businesses in Montana precludes the Montana Department of Commerce's Bureau of
Business Regulation and the Secretary of State's Corporate Licensing Bureau from accurately determining the number of franchises
created in the state. This process allows Montana franchisees to
register under a fictitious name, which name need not indicate the
parent franchisor. 11
The proliferation of franchise operations has increased the
need for courts to determine whether national franchisors can be
found liable for the tortious acts of their franchisees. The Montana
Supreme Court, however, has yet to rule on this liability. When
presented in 1987 with its first case involving the liability of a
franchisor for a franchisee's tort, the court ruled only on the validity of a grant of summary judgment.1 2 The issue of franchisor liability thus remains unresolved in Montana.
This comment examines the issue of franchisor liability by
Id. at 25-26.
Id. at 26.
8. Hotch & Whittenmore, Franchising:Find That Niche, 75 NATIONS BUSINESS 35
(Feb. 1987).
The franchising boom continues to occur despite the imposition of a franchise fee, for
the rights inherent in using the franchise, which can run to $50,000 or higher plus the requirement for payment of monthly royalties-usually 5-7% of the gross-and for monthly
advertising fees. Bacas, Leaving the Corporate Nest-The Franchise Route, 75 NATIONS
BUSINESS 14, 20 (Mar. 1987).
9. Hotch & Whittenmore, Franchising: Find That Niche, 75 NATIONS BUSINESS 35
(Feb. 1987).
10. Id. This number only estimates the size of the franchising boom because the speed
of franchise growth is so rapid nobody knows the precise numbers. Id.
11. MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 30-13-201 to -202 (1987).
12. Burkland v. Electronic Realty Ass'n, Mont. -, 740 P.2d 1142 (1987).
6.
7.
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first discussing the elements necessary to establish an agency relationship, which relationship is necessary if a franchisor is to be
held liable. Analysis then turns to the threshold element necessary
for an actual agency: the control exercised by the franchisor over
the franchisee's day-to-day operations. The comment next proceeds to an analysis of two key elements necessary for a finding of
ostensible agency, the extent to which use of logos, trademarks and
advertising creates a "holding out" and the extent to which a third
party has relied on the authority of the franchisee. The comment
then discusses the type of acts for which a franchisor may be held
liable if an agency exists. Finally, it concludes by recommending a
structure for use in analysis of a tort case involving a franchise.

II.
A.

THE NECESSITY OF AN AGENCY RELATIONSHIP

Liability Hinges on the Determination of an Agency
Relationship

To hold a franchisor vicariously liable for the tortious acts of a
franchisee, an agency relationship must exist between the two.1
Montana law provides a general analysis of the nature of an agency
by stating, "an agent is one who represents another, called the
principal, in dealings with third persons. 14 The Montana Supreme
Court will not presume the existence of an agency, but rather it
will require the party asserting the existence of an agency to carry
the burden of proof.1 6 Once the third party proves the existence of
an agency, the franchisor cannot insulate itself merely by asserting
the existence of a franchise agreement. 6
B.

Two Types of Agency Relationship

1. Actual Agency
Courts can hold a franchisor liable for franchisee torts if a determination is made that an actual agency exists. An actual agency
exists when the three following elements are found: manifestation
of assent by the franchisor, an act by the franchisee providing
some degree of benefit to the franchisor, and control by the
franchisor."7
The third element, control by the franchisor over the fran13. Hayman v. Ramada Inn, Inc., 357 S.E.2d 394, 397 (N.C. App. 1987).
14. MONT.CODE ANN. § 28-10-101 (1987).
15. Elkins v. Husky Oil Co., 153 Mont. 157, 166, 455 P.2d 329, 332-33 (1969) (citing
Hamilton v. Lion Head Ski Lift, Inc., 139 Mont. 335, 363 P.2d 716 (1961)).
16. Murphy, 216 Va. at 494, 219 S.E.2d at 877.
17. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 1 (1958).
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chisee's day-to-day operations, is the key, often-disputed, element
to establishing an actual agency."s Thus, an assessment of whether
the controls exercised by a franchisor over a franchisee are sufficient to give rise to an actual agency relationship is a threshold
question when determining whether a franchisor can be held liable
for the torts of its franchisee.
a. Control Considered Sufficient to Establish an Agency
Relationship
An analysis of what control is sufficient to establish an actual
agency entails an examination of the degree of the franchisor's
control, as specified in the contract, over the franchisee and of the
degree of control actually exercised over the franchisee.1 9 In looking at the control specified in the franchise contract, a number of
jurisdictions have found that "[i]f, in practical effect, one of the
parties has the right to exercise complete control over the [day-today] operation by the other an agency relationship exists."'
The Montana Supreme Court examined the degree of control
actually exercised in the non-franchise case of Elkins v. Husky Oil
Co. 21 In Elkins, an accidental fire at a Husky station caused a customer's death. The court endorsed the plaintiff's view that control
would only be sufficient if the principal controlled the compensa18. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 1 (1958). See, e.g., Salisbury v. Chapman Realty, 124 Ill. App. 3d 1057, 465 N.E.2d 127 (1984). Elkins, 153 Mont. at 157, 455 P.2d at 329;
Coe v. Esau, 377 P.2d 815 (Okla. 1963); Murphy, 216 Va. at 490, 219 S.E.2d at 874; Apple v.
Standard Oil, 307 F. Supp. 107 (N.D. Cal. 1969); Ottensmeyer v. Baskin, 2 Haw. App. 86,
625 P.2d 1069 (1981); Ortega v. General Motors Co., 392 So. 2d 40, (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1980); Stanford v. Dairy Queen Prod., 623 S.W.2d 797 (Tex. Civ. App. 1981); Singleton v.
Int'l Dairy Queen, Inc., 332 A.2d 160 (Del. 1975); Duluth Herald and News Tribune v. Plymouth Optical Co., 286 Minn. 495, 176 N.W.2d 552 (1970); Beck v. Arthur Murray, Inc., 245
Cal. App. 2d 976, 54 Cal. Rptr. 328 (1966); Nichols v. Arthur Murray, Inc., 248 Cal. App. 2d
610, 56 Cal. Rptr. 728 (1967).
19. Ottensmeyer, 2 Haw. App. at 89, 625 P.2d at 1071.
Where a sufficient degree of control and direction is manifested by the parent
franchisor, an agency relationship may be created. Whether the relationship between a franchisor and a franchisee is that of principal and agent, at least insofar
as this relationship affects a stranger to the franchise agreement, is dependent
upon the intention of the parties as determined from the written agreement and
the accompanying circumstances. The declaration of the parties in the agreement
respecting the nature of the relationship created thereby are not controlling, however, and, as with contracts generally, the writings must be considered as a whole.
Salisbury v. Chapman Realty, 124 111.App. 3d 1057, 1061, 465 N.E.2d 127, 131 (1984) (quoting 62 AM. JUR. 2D Private Franchise Contracts § 15 (1972)). See also Singleton, 332 A.2d
160.
20. Nichols, 248 Cal. App. 2d at 610, 56 Cal. Rptr. at 731.
21. 153 Mont. 157, 455 P.2d 329.
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tion of employees and hours of operation.2 2 Because such controls
were not exercised, the court found that an agency relationship
was not created. Other courts have found that if the franchisor exercises control over compensation and hours of operation such controls will be sufficient to give rise to an actual agency
relationship."
In the Florida case of Ortega v. General Motors Corp.,2 4 the
plaintiff sought to hold GMC vicariously liable for injuries resulting when a truck sold by a franchise dealer rolled over. The court
held that GMC was not liable because the company did not exercise the controls "of greatest importance" 2 5-namely, control over
hiring, firing and supervision. 2' The Ortega court also stated that
an important criteria to be considered when determining the sufficiency of control is "[i]ndependent ownership of a substantial
27
enterprise. ,
In the Delaware case of Singleton v. International Dairy
Queen, Inc.,28 a young girl injured herself when she fell through
the glass door of a Dairy Queen franchise. The court held that the
controls exercised and manifested by the franchisor were such that
"the very lifeblood of the [franchisee was] in the hands of the
franchisor."2 9 The controls cited by the court included mandating
the size, shape and appearance of a franchisee's establishment, imposing the nationally known sign as the only sign for the premises,
requiring all containers to show the name of the parent company,
dictating portion control, the size and shape of containers, the
uniforms of employees, subjecting the franchisee to the obligation
to obey subsequent rules and regulations, reserving the right to inspect the premises, naming the suppliers used, and even dictating
what else might be sold on the premises.3 0 The court found that
these actions constituted control sufficient to give rise to an actual
agency, further adding that there could be no greater control than
that over portion control and the unilateral franchise termination
control held by the franchisor.31
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.

Id. at 163, 455 P.2d at 331-32.
Salisbury, 124 Ill. App. 3d at 1061, 465 N.E.2d at 131.
392 So. 2d 40.
Id. at 42.
Id. at 43.
Id.
332 A.2d at 161.
Id. at 163.
Id. at 162-63.
Id. at 163.
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b. Control Considered Insufficient to Establish an Agency
Relationship
Courts have generally held that the degree of control exercised
is insufficient to establish an actual agency if the franchisor fails to
tell the franchisee how the day-to-day franchise business is to be
conducted.32 For example, in Coe v. Esau33 the court held that a
principal's control was insufficient to give rise to an actual agency
because the station owner handled the goods of other suppliers,
controlled the hiring and firing, determined his own business hours
and methods, and developed independent merchandising policy
restrictions.
In Stanford v. Dairy Queen Products,3" consumption of an allegedly unwholesome cheeseburger resulting in illness and aggravation of a pre-existing heart condition prompted a suit alleging
franchisor liability. In this case, the franchisor exercised control
over: food-preparation procedures, periodic inspections, uniforms,
financial record keeping, advertising expenditures, membership in
a trade association, blue print approval for the building, operating
procedures and advertising, and employment and supervisory practices. The court thus held that the franchisor was not liable because these controls were insufficient to establish an agency.35
In Drexel v. Union Prescription Centers,6 a federal district
court in Pennsylvania had to rule on whether a franchisor would
be liable for injuries resulting when its drugstore franchisee improperly filled a prescription. The court held that the franchisor
lacked sufficient control over the franchisee, even though the
franchise was registered in the franchisor's name, bags, prescription labels, cash register receipts only had the franchisor's name
inscribed on them, and advertising and phone book listings were in
37
the franchisor's name.
c.

The Effect of the Lanham Act on the Factor of Control

The federal Lanham Act 38 mandates that a franchisor, as a
trademark owner, must exercise control over its franchisee in order
to preserve the trademark rights granted by the law and to protect
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.

Greening v. Gazette Printing, 108 Mont. 158, 172, 88 P.2d 862, 867 (1939).
377 P.2d 815, 818-19 (Okla. 1963).
623 S.W.2d at 799.
Id. at 802-03.
428 F. Supp. 663 (D.C. Pa. 1977).
Id. at 677.
15 U.S.C. §§ 1051 to 1127 (1964).
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the public against deceptive practices in use of the trademark."
Thus, courts often hear arguments that the controls exercised by a
franchisor arise principally from its requirement to protect its
trademark, tradename and good will and should not give rise to an
agency relationship. ° This control results from the economic fact
that a franchisor's trademark often represents its principal asset.4 1
Whether this control "is sufficient to establish an agency relationship depends, in each case, upon the nature and extent of the
power defined in the franchise contract."4' 2
The Lanham Act may pose a catch-22 for franchisors. Failure
to exercise the necessary control would result in abandonment of
the trademark. On the other hand, the controls necessary to prevent abandonment of the trademark are also the kind of controls a
court could find sufficient to establish an agency relationship.
Those who argue that trademark controls should be held sufficient
to establish an agency assert that third parties patronizing the
franchisee, because of the quality of goods or services that they
have associated with the trademark, should have a right to recourse against the owner/franchisor of the trademark.4"
No court has yet ruled on the issue of whether such federally
mandated trademark regulations could constitute controls sufficient to give rise to an agency relationship. But the holding by the
court in the Wisconsin case of Star Line Trucking v. Department
39. 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1964) states:
The term "trade-mark" includes any word, name, symbol or device or any combination thereof adopted and used by a manufacturer or merchant to identify his
goods and distinguish them from those manufactured or sold by others . . . . A
mark shall be deemed to be "abandoned". . . [w]hen any course of conduct of the
registrant, including acts of omission as well as commission, causes the mark to
lose its significance as an indication of origin.
The statute has been interpreted as follows:
If the owner of a trademark wants to license the use thereof to another
and still retain as his own the enjoyment of the rights stemming therefrom, he must do so in such a way that he maintains sufficient control
over the nature and quality of the finished product, over the activities of
the licensee, as will enable the licensor to sustain his original position of
guarantor to the public that the goods now bearing the trademark are of
the same nature and quality as were the goods bearing the trademark
before the licensing, or, that the mark now has the same meaning as far
as the public is concerned as it did before the licensing.
Morse-Starrett Prod. Co. v. Steccone, 86 F. Supp. 796, 805 (N.D. Cal. 1949).
40. Nichols, 248 Cal. App. 2d at 610, 56 Cal. Rptr. at 731.
41. Murphy, 216 Va. at 494-95, 219 S.E.2d at 877.
42. Id.
43. Comment, Liability of a Franchisorfor the Acts of the Franchisee,41 S. CAL. L.
REV. 143, 148 n.24 (1968) (citing Lahart, Control-the Sine Qua Non of a Valid Trademark
License, 50 TRADEMARK REP. 103, 134 (1960)). If the customer has reasonably relied on the
controls inherent in the trademark, then ostensible agency may be found. Id.
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of Industry,"' an unemployment compensation case, gives valuable
insight into how a Montana court might rule on this issue. In Star
Line, the plaintiff asserted its truck owner-operators were not employees of the trucking firm, and the firm was therefore not liable
for unemployment compensation, because the Interstate Commerce Commission and Wisconsin Administrative Code 45 had mandated the firm's specific controls over the truck owner-operator."6
The Wisconsin Supreme Court noted that the contractual exercise of control over an independent contractor could be sufficient
to give rise to an agency relationship. Furthermore, it recognized
that the Interstate Commerce Commission requirement "arguably
constitutes contractual control. '47 The court, however, held that
such federally and state required controls, promulgated to promote
public safety and ensure financial responsibility, could not be used
to establish control sufficient to give rise to an employer-employee
relationship. 8
The situation in Star Line, although it arose from an unemployment compensation case, is analogous to that arising because
of the Lanham Act's trademark control requirements. The broader
principle of the Star Line holding, that the controls federally mandated for protection of the public shall not be held to give rise to
an agency relationship, is similarly analogous. When presented
with a tort claim asserted against a franchisor under an agency
theory of liability, courts should thus hold that controls mandated
to protect the product and public under the federal Lanham Act
will not be sufficient to give rise to an agency relationship. However, if the controls go beyond those required to protect the trademark, tradename and good will, and also cover day-to-day details
of operations, a Montana court should hold that such excess controls are sufficient to give rise to an agency. 9
2.

Ostensible Agency5"
Even if no actual agency relationship exists, a franchisor may

44. 109 Wis. 2d 266, 325 N.W.2d 872 (1982).
45. Id. at 276, 325 N.W.2d at 877.
46. Id. at 276, 325 N.W.2d at 877 (citing Stafford Trucking, Inc. v. Dep't of Indus.,
Labor & Human Relations, 102 Wis. 2d 256, 306 N.W.2d 79 (Ct. App. 1981)).
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Nichols, 248 Cal. App. 2d at 611, 56 Cal. Rptr. at 731-34.
50. A plethora of different terms are used in case law to refer to the concept of ostensible agency. It is sometimes called "apparent" agency, or agency by estoppel. Mabe v. B.P.
Oil, 31 Md. App. 221, 240, 356 A.2d 304, 315 (1976) (Melvin J., dissenting), rev'd on appeal,
279 Md. 632, 370 A.2d 554 (1977); see also Gizzi v. Texaco, 437 F.2d 308, 309 (3d Cir. 1971).
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be held vicariously liable if the existence of an ostensible agency is
established. 51 An ostensible agency occurs when two circumstances
are met. First, the franchisor must represent to a third person or
"hold out" that the franchisee is acting on the franchisor's behalf. 2
A "holding out" occurs when the franchisor "clothes" the franchisee with authority.5 3 Signs of advertising typically indicate such
a representation. 54 Second, the third person must rely on that representation or "holding out. '5 5 This reliance must result in a
change of position, 56 and must be reasonable under the
circumstances. 7
Stated another way, ostensible agency arises when the principle either intentionally or through want of ordinary care causes the
third person to believe the agent represents the principal. 58 This
want of ordinary care has been defined by the Montana Supreme
Court as "the failure to do what a reasonable and prudent person
would ordinarily have done under the circumstances of the situation, or doing what such person under the existing circumstances
59
would not have done.
a. Establishing a "Holding Out" through the Use of Logos
and Trademarks
(1) Shared Identity, Logos, and Trademarks
In Elkins, the Montana Supreme Court considered the issue of
whether the principal's use of trademarks and logos alone is sufficient to create a "holding out" and thereby give rise to an ostensible agency. The plaintiff asserted that the Husky signs used at the
gas station and the language on the back of the credit card held by
the plaintiff stating, "[t]his card will also be honored at service stations of the following companies:. . .Husky Oil Co.," 6 were sufficient to create a "holding out" which was then reasonably relied on
Montana's statutes use the term "ostensible" agency.
51. MONT. CODE ANN. § 28-10-103 (1987).
52. Cf. Elkins, 153 Mont. at 168, 455 P.2d at 333 (citing Hartt v. Jahn, 59 Mont. 173,
196 P. 153 (1921)) (which case involved an employer-employee relationship).
53. Cf. Hartt, 59 Mont. at 181, 196 P. at 156 (which case involved a real estate
contract).
54. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY, §§ 27, 8 comment b (1958).
55. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY, § 267 (1958).
56. Calkins v. Oxbow Ranch, Inc., 159 Mont. 120, 126, 495 P.2d 1124, 1127 (1972).
57. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY, § 267 (1958); Gizzi, 437 F.2d at 309.
58. MONT. CODE ANN. § 28-10-103 (1987).
59. Ahlquist v. Mulvaney Realty Co., 116 Mont. 6, 23, 152 P.2d 137, 145 (1944) (quoting Zanos v. Great Northern R.R. Co., 60 Mont. 17, 21-22, 198 P. 138, 140 (1921)) (which
case involved the negligence of a common carrier).
60. Elkins, 153 Mont. at 167, 455 P.2d at 333.
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by the plaintiff. The court agreed with the Coe court that goods
marketed under a trademark name are not enough to create a
holding out sufficient to establish an ostensible agency
relationship. 1
In the Montana case of Burkland v. Electronic Realty Associates, Inc., 2 the Burklands alleged that the franchisor, Electronic
Realty Associates, Inc. (ERA), should be held liable for injuries
caused by the negligence, fraud and breach of the implied warranty covering a home sold to them by the franchisee ERA
Hannah Real Estate (ERA Hannah). More specifically, plaintiffs
suffered from ill health caused by the home's water system and
from the breakdown of the home's heating system. 3
The Burklands asserted that the requirements of the franchise
agreement, 4 which included the requirement that ERA Hannah
prominently display the ERA national logo on all advertising and
materials, constituted a "holding out" sufficient to establish an ostensible agency relationship between ERA and ERA Hannah."6
The Burklands claimed that the requirement that ERA Hannah
use the ERA trademark and logo, contribute to a national ERA
advertising fund, and participate in local advertising and marketing created a "shared identity" sufficient to qualify as a "holding
out" under section 28-10-103 of the Montana Code Annotated."6
Further, the Burklands contended they had relied on the national
reputation of ERA in purchasing the home. Thus, the plaintiffs
claimed that an ostensible agency existed between ERA and ERA
Hannah and that ERA could be held liable for its franchisee's
actions.
Defendant ERA, however, argued that ERA Hannah was independently owned and operated and that they exercised no control
over the management and operations of ERA Hannah. Furthermore, ERA asserted that ERA Hannah was required to use
"Hannah" in all advertising, and that they merely charged fixed
fees for use of the ERA trademark and national marketing
services."
The district court granted ERA's motion for summary judgment, holding that the Burklands failed to offer sufficient evidence
61. Id. at 166, 455 P.2d at 331-32; Coe, 377 P.2d at 818.
62. __
Mont. -, 740 P.2d 1142 (1987).
63. Id.
64. Burkland v. Mullen, No. 84-2467, slip op. 1, 5 (Dist. Ct. Mont. Aug. 28, 1986),
rev'd sub nom. Burkland v. Electronic Realty Ass'n, - Mont. , 740 P.2d 1142 (1987).
65. Electronic Realty Ass'n, - Mont. at -,
740 P.2d at 1144.
66. Mullen, No. 84-2467, slip op. at 5.
67. Electronic Realty Ass'n, __
Mont. at __, 740 P.2d at 1143.
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to establish an agency relationship. The Montana Supreme Court
reversed the district court and remanded the case for a proper determination of whether the plaintiffs reasonably relied on the
trademark, reputation and advertising of ERA."
A split opinion exists in other jurisdictions as to what constitutes a holding out sufficient to give rise to ostensible agency. 9 In
City of Delta Junction v. Mack Trucks, Inc.,7 0 city officials purchased a customized fire truck from Alaska Mack, Inc., a dealer
engaged in selling Mack, Inc. trucks. Because the weight of a full
water tank proved too substantial for the truck's chassis design,
the fire truck turned out to be unsuitable for its intended purposes
and Mack, Inc. was brought in as a defendant on a theory of apparent agency.7 1 The Alaska court found that Alaska Mack's telephone listing under the heading "Mack Trucks," the advertising
with the Mack logo, and the failure to post signs indicating Alaska
Mack was independently owned and operated constituted a "holding out."72
In Wood v. Holiday Inns, Inc. ,7 an Holiday Inn employee
seized a guest's Gulf Oil Company credit card, used to charge lodging at the inn, after being instructed to do so by Gulf's credit card
operations because of the guest's allegedly poor credit. The plaintiff claimed the circumstances surrounding the erroneous seizure of
his credit card caused him to suffer a heart attack. Plaintiff thus
sued Gulf, the Holiday Inn franchisee and the franchisor Holiday
Inns. The Wood court reasoned that the existence of trademarks
was critical to a determination of whether a "holding out" existed:
[t]he Phenix City facility was required to use the same service
marks and trademarks, and exterior and interior decor as the
Holiday Inns owned by the parent company. A jury could therefore reasonably conclude that the license agreement required the
...facility to be of such an appearance that travelers would believe it was owned by Holiday Inns, Inc.74
The Ortega court addressed the issue of whether GMC held
68. Id. at __,
740 P.2d at 1145.
69. Compare Apple, 307 F. Supp. at 115 (which held that the facts of the case were
insufficient to give rise to an ostensible agency) and Ortega, 392 So. 2d at 44 (which held
that the facts of the case were insufficient to give rise to an ostensible agency) with City of
Delta Junction, 670 P.2d 1131 (Alaska 1983) (which held that the facts in the case were
sufficient to give rise to an ostensible agency).
70. 670 P.2d at 1131.
71. Id. at 1129.
72. Id. at 1131.
73. 508 F.2d 167, 169-70 (5th Cir. 1975).
74. Id. at 176.
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out a local GMC truck dealer as its agent by allowing the dealer to
use the manufacturer's signs and logos. 7 5 This court, contrary to
the holding in City of Delta Junction, held that the franchisee's
display of GMC signs and trademarks was insufficient to create a
"holding out" and thus to give rise to an ostensible agency
76
relationship.
b.

Common Knowledge Doctrine

The common knowledge doctrine states that "it is . . .a matter of common knowledge and practice that distinctive colors and
trademark signs are displayed at gasoline stations by independent
dealers of petroleum product suppliers . . .[and that] [t]hese signs
and emblems represent no more than notice to the motorist that a
' 7
given company's products are being marketed at the station. 1
The franchisor will use this doctrine to avoid a finding of agency in
cases where signs and logos are claimed to create a holding out
such that ostensible agency is established.7 8
Franchisors can apply the doctrine by proving that the public
has common knowledge concerning the independent status of a
business. For example, this was applied in Burkland when the
plaintiff claimed the defendant presented no evidence that the
public had common knowledge about real estate franchises suffi70
cient to prevent the finding of an ostensible agency.
c.

Reliance

A third party has the burden of proving a reasonable reliance
on a franchisor's reputation, logos and advertising in order to establish the franchisor's liability predicated on a theory of ostensible agency. "[Ilt must not only be shown that the plaintiff's belief
and reliance were reasonable, but that they were caused by affirmative acts or by negligence on the part of the principal .
"..
80
In Burkland, the Montana Supreme Court noted that the Burklands had "relied on the national TV advertising they had seen of
ERA [and on] the reputation of ERA, Inc., and they believed they
75. Ortega, 392 So. 2d at 44.
76. Id. See also Apple, 307 F. Supp. at 115.
77. Elkins, 153 Mont. at 165, 455 P.2d at 332 (quoting Coe, 377 P.2d at 818); see also
Reynolds v. Skelly Oil Co., 227 Iowa 163, 170, 287 N.W. 823, 827 (1939); Ortega, 392 So. 2d
at 43-44.
78. Coe, 377 P.2d at 818.
79. Appellant's opening brief at 7, Burkland v. Electronic Realty Ass'n,
- Mont.
__
740 P.2d 1142 (1987).
80. Annot., Vicarious Liability of Private Franchisor, 81 A.L.R.3D § 5[a], at 781
(1977); see also Beck, 245 Cal. App. 2d at 976, 54 Cal. Rptr. at 330.
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were dealing with ERA at the time of purchasing the home."'" The
court thus ruled that the district court's grant of summary judgment was erroneous, for a key material fact remained as to
82
whether a disclaimer made such reliance on ERA unreasonable.
The Burkland court appeared to rely exclusively on City of
Delta Junction to hold that reliance on trademarks and reputation
was sufficient to raise a jury question as to whether such reliance
could establish an ostensible agency relationship.8" As with the
Burklands, City of Delta Junction officials believed they were
dealing with the franchisor when they purchased the modified
Mack truck and relied on the franchisor's reputation. 4 Although
the Burkland court only ruled on the issue before it, whether the
facts raised issues of fact such that a grant of summary judgment
was improper, the court's reliance on City of Delta Junction indicates that it approved the Alaska court's determination that reliance on trademarks is reasonable.8 5
d. Disclaimers
Disclaimers are often used to prevent a franchisor from being
held liable for tortious acts of the franchisee under an ostensible
agency theory. Often, franchisors will require that the franchisee
exhibit a disclaimer sign stating the local business is independently
owned and operated. 86 However, one of the clear conclusions of the
case law is that the franchisor, to make an effective disclaimer,
must require more than the display of a vague and ambiguous sign
of independent ownership and operation.8 7
Attempts to use disclaimer signs have not received favorable
treatment by the courts. 88 For instance, the Murphy court held
that "[w]hen an agreement, considered as a whole, establishes an
agency relationship, the parties cannot effectively disclaim it by
formal 'consent . . . the relationship of the parties does not depend upon what the parties themselves call it, but rather in law
81. Electronic Realty Ass'n, __
Mont. at -, 740 P.2d at 1145.
82. Id.
83. Id. at , 740 P.2d at 1144-45.
84. City of Delta Junction, 670 P.2d at 1131.
85. Electronic Realty Ass'n, __
Mont. at __,
740 P.2d at 1144-45.
86. Salisbury v. ChapmaA Realty, 124 Ill.
App. 3d 1057, 1062, 465 N.E.2d 127, 131
(1984).
87. Beck, 245 Cal. App. 2d at 980, 54 Cal. Rptr. at 331.
88. See Murphy, 216 Va. at 494, 219 S.E.2d at 876; Beck, 245 Cal. App. 2d at 979, 54
Cal. Rptr. at 330; Ottensmeyer, 2 Haw. App. at 89, 625 P.2d at 1071; Salisbury, 124 Ill. App.
3d at 1062, 465 N.E.2d at 131.
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what it actually is.' "89
3.

Analysis of the "Holding Out" Factor

A court's finding that a franchisor's use of logos and trademarks is a sufficient "holding out" to create agency may be anachronistic. Clearly the use of logos and trademarks in advertising is
so completely ubiquitous in the modern era that any liability based
merely on reliance on them or the reputation engendered therefrom requires more substantial underpinning. In addition, the ruling by the Wisconsin court in Star Line indicates that compliance
with federal requirements concerning control sufficient to maintain
a trademark will not support a finding of agency.
Perhaps the most significant standard in evaluating whether a
"holding out" exists is the reasonableness of the third party's reliance.9 0 This standard provides an exception from liability for
franchisors who require a posting of large, clearly visible signs on
the franchisee's business premises-signs which clearly state that
the franchise is independently owned and operated.9 1 In addition,
this standard requires claimants to demonstrate that they would
have chosen an alternative good or service or that they would have
done something differently but for their reliance on those specific
franchisor attributes manifested by the franchisee.92

III.

APPLICATION OF AGENCY To A FRANCHISOR'S LIABILITY FOR
THE ACTS OF A FRANCHISEE

The specific type of agency relationship must be determined
once an agency has been established in order to pinpoint the types
of tortious acts for which a franchisor may be held liable. A franchisee can be one of two types of agent-an independent contractor agent or an employee-agent. As the Montana Supreme Court
stated in Elkins, "it cannot be disputed that the main distinction
between . . . [an] employee and an independent contractor lies in
89. Murphy, 216 Va. at 492, 219 S.E.2d at 876 (quoting from Chandler v. Kelly, 149
Va. 221, 231, 141 S.E. 389, 391-92 (1928)). In Kuchta v. Allied Builders Corp., 21 Cal. App.
3d 541, 98 Cal. Rptr. 588 (1971), the California court has stated that "declarations of the
parties in the agreement respecting the nature of the relationship are not controlling." Id. at
548, 98 Cal. Rptr. at 591. The Burkland case addressed the use of disclaimers, particularly
as the Burklands stated in their affidavit that "they did not notice the 'independently
owned and operated' disclaimer in ERA Hannah's listing of the Mullen home nor was it
explained to them." Electronic Realty Ass'n, __
Mont. at -,
740 P.2d at 1143.
90. Electronic Realty Ass'n, __
Mont. at __,
740 P.2d at 1144.
91. See generally Beck, 245 Cal. App. 2d 976, 54 Cal. Rptr. 328.
92. Hayman, 357 S.E.2d at 398.
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3
the right of control over the performance of the work.",
An independent contractor agent is one who is told what to do
but not how to do it, for the independent contractor represents
"the will of his employer only as to the result of his work, and not
as to the means by which it is accomplished." 9' 4 Conversely, an employee is one told both what to do and how to do it.5

The test for distinguishing between the two types of
agent-those being told what to do versus those being told what to
do and how to do it-is whether or not the franchisor has control
over the operational affairs of the franchisee.9 6 The Restatement
(Second) of Agency provides further clarification of this concept by
stating:
It is only when to the relation of principal and agent there is
added that right to control physical details as to the manner of
performance which is characteristic of the relation of ... [employer and employee] that the person in whose service the act is
done becomes subject to liability for the physical conduct of the
actor." '
93. Elkins, 153 Mont. 159, 163, 455 P.2d 329, 331 (1969).
94. Greening, 108 Mont. 158, 168, 88 P.2d 862, 865 (1939).
95. Id. at 168, 88 P.2d at 865.
96. The court in Standard Chemical Mfg. v. Employment Sec. Div., 185 Mont. 241,
605 P.2d 610 (1980) stated:
The first test is the so-called "ABC" test and is established by statute: "Service
performed by an individual for wages is considered to be employment subject to
this chapter unless and until it is shown to the satisfaction of the division that:
(a) such individual has been and will continue to be free from control or direction
over the performance of such services, both under his contract and in fact;
(b) such service is either outside the usual course of the business for which such
service is performed or that such service is performed outside of all the places of
business of the enterprise for which such service is performed; and
(c) such individual is customarily engaged in an independently established trade,
occupation, profession, or business." § 39-51-203(4), M.C.A. (1985).
[This 1985 edition, has since been amended by MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-51-203(4) (1987)].
The second test, as expressed in Shope v. City of Billings, 85 Mont. 302, 306, 278 P.
826, 827 (1929) states that: "An independent contractor is one who renders service in the
course of an occupation, and represents the will of his employer only as the result of his
work, and not as to the means whereby it is accomplished, and is usually not paid by the
job."
Id. at 244-45, 605 P.2d at 612-13 (this case involved an employer-employee relationship).
97. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY, § 250 comment a (1958).
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A graphic representation of this concept is shown below.
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Each type of agency has a particular liability attaching to it. In
brief, those types of agency and their consequent liability are as
follows:
(a) Where the franchisor has a duty and breaches that duty
(e.g. duty to supervise, duty to employ proper persons), that
franchisor is always liable for the contract or tortious actions of its
franchisee regardless of whether the franchisee is found to be an
independent contractor or an employee. 9
(b) Where a franchisee commits fraud, the franchisor may be
held liable whether or not an independent contractor or employee
agency is established. 0 0°
(c) Where the franchisor has not breached a duty, in order to
be held liable for the negligent or tortious action of its franchisee a
franchisor must be found to be an employer. 10 1
The issue of whether a franchisor can be held to be an employer or whether a franchisee can be held to be an employee or
independent contractor has not been determined. However, one
court has found that a limited employer/employee relation can be
found in the franchise context on very minimal grounds. In
Wood, 10 2 the court found, citing section 220 of the Restatement
(Second) of Agency, the jury could reasonably conclude a limited
98. Lecture by Steven C. Bahls, assistant professor of law, University of Montana
School of Law (Oct. 8, 1987).
99. Cf. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §§ 212-215 (1958) (which states rules generally applicable to principals and agents).
100.

Cf. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 261 (1958) (which states rules generally

applicable to principals and agents).
101.

Cf. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219-229 (1958) (which states rules gener-

ally applicable to principals and agents); see also Kornec v. Mike Horse Mining & Milling
Co., 120 Mont. 1, 180 P.2d 252 (1947).
102. Wood, 508 F.2d at 173.
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employer/employee relationship existed between Gulf Oil Co. and
the Holiday Inn franchisee for the purpose of accepting Gulf's
credit card as payment.108 The decision was based on the degree of
control exercised by Gulf over the service of extending credit or
revoking credit cards.' 4 By establishing an employer/employee relationship between two separate business organizations, Wood potentially sets the stage for a court to find such a relationship exists
between a franchisor and franchisee thereby making the franchisor
liable for all acts of the franchisee.
IV.

SUMMARY

When analyzing whether a franchisor should be liable for the
torts of its franchisee, it is essential that an agency relationship be
established by first proving an actual agency. This should be done
by evaluating the degree of control the franchisor exercises over
the day-to-day operations of the franchisee. If "the spirit and essence of the contract, considered as a whole . . . [reserves] in the
[franchisor] the power to impose his will upon the [franchisee] in
accomplishing the purposes and objectives of the contract,"' 1 then
control would be sufficient to give rise to actual agency. Should the
degree of control be insufficient or ambiguous so that actual agency
is in question, then look to ostensible agency. To establish an ostensible agency there must be proof that the franchisor "held out"
the franchisee as its agent and that the third person reasonably
relied on that holding out to his or her harm.
The common law, as the cases cited in this comment illustrate,
has developed differing results with similar facts as to whether an
agency relationship exists between a franchisor and its franchisee.
An alternative means of analysis of agency relationship is provided
in sections 212-215 and 250 of the Restatement (Second) of
Agency. The Restatement asks whether the franchisor intended
the conduct of its franchisee, authorized the result, had a particularized duty to have the franchisee's act performed with care, acted
recklessly in giving instructions or in hiring or supervision, or unintentionally authorized the conduct of the franchisee leading to the
tort. The Restatement may be preferred because it provides a
more definitive statement of agency for purposes of determining
the liability of a franchisor for the torts of its franchisee.

103.
104.
105.

Id. at 173-74.
Id. at 173-74.
Stanford, 623 S.W.2d at 803.
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